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Security

Security, tenancy and responsible-AI enforcement

Where each defence sits, which route is permitted, and which ingress stops at the boundary.

Security, tenancy and responsible-AI enforcement A secure paved road. An authenticated caller passes ordered safety gates and a server-side filter built from the caller's claims into per-study isolated sources; retrieved spans are screened for indirect prompt injection before drafting. An attempt to widen scope through typed text and a preview or remote source are both stopped at the compliance boundary. Every step is persisted to a private checkpoint store and to an audit and compliance store. UNTRUSTED INGRESS COMPLIANCE BOUNDARY · GA SURFACES ONLY PRIVATE INFRASTRUCTURE · RBAC Authenticated caller site user · MCP agent Entra ID Preview / remote source outside the boundary Ordered safety gates PII → Shield → filter → verdict the order is the graph's topology, not a convention Draft → verdict → deliver least-privilege identity read and retrieve only Claims-based filter server-side built from claims, never from user text Per-study sources 1 index / study Retrieved-span shield screens spans for indirect injection, before the draft Checkpoint store a trust boundary: encrypted, no untrusted load Audit + compliance store App Insights · immutable activity log + tokens REQUEST SCREENED QUESTION CLAIMS-SCOPED SCREENED SPANS PERSIST EVERY STEP SCOPE FROM TYPED TEXT PREVIEW SOURCE: BLOCKED LEGEND Permitted route Blocked at the boundary Audit / persist Safety gate Enforcement point Private store
Reference designOpen full size

What it shows

The permitted route is a paved road. An authenticated caller's request passes the safety gates in a fixed order, then a server-side filter built from the caller's claims selects the sources of the studies that caller may see.

Retrieved text is treated as untrusted: a shield screens the spans for indirect prompt injection before they reach the draft. The drafting step runs under a least-privilege identity that can only read and retrieve.

Two routes stop at the compliance boundary. A question that tries to widen its own scope in the typed text has no effect, because the filter never reads the text. A preview or remote source that would take data outside the boundary is not on the production path.

This is a reference design for an agentic clinical-trials Q&A assistant. It is a design, not a description of a system built as shown.

Key decisions

  • Gate order is a hard requirement, enforced by the graph's topology and not by convention.
  • The tenancy filter comes from claims and is applied at the query layer, not as post-processing.
  • The checkpoint store is a trust boundary: private, encrypted, and never loaded from an untrusted source.
  • Production uses generally available services only; previews are for development and evaluation.